Delaware Riverkeeper Network v. Secretary Pennsylvania Departm by unknown
2017 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
3-24-2017 
Delaware Riverkeeper Network v. Secretary Pennsylvania Departm 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2017 
Recommended Citation 
"Delaware Riverkeeper Network v. Secretary Pennsylvania Departm" (2017). 2017 Decisions. 284. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2017/284 
This March is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in 2017 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. 
   PRECEDENTIAL 
 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 
_________________________ 
 
No. 15-2122 
_________________________ 
 
 
DELAWARE RIVERKEEPER NETWORK; 
MAYA VAN ROSSUM, the Delaware Riverkeeper, 
 
         
       Petitioners 
 
v. 
 
SECRETARY PENNSYLVANIA DEPARTMENT OF 
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION; PENNSYLVANIA 
DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION, 
 
         
       Respondents 
 
TRANSCONTINENTAL GAS PIPE LINE CORP, 
 
         
            Intervenor Respondent 
 
 
2 
 
_________________________ 
 
No. 15-2158 
_________________________ 
 
NEW JERSEY CONSERVATION FOUNDATION; 
STONY BROOK MILLSTONE WATERSHED 
ASSOCIATION; FRIENDS OF PRINCETON  
OPEN SPACE, 
         
      Petitioners 
 
v. 
 
NEW JERSEY DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL 
PROTECTION; TRANSCONTINENTAL GAS  
PIPE LINE CORP, 
         
       Respondents 
 
 
On Petition for Review of an Order of the 
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission 
(Agency Nos. FERC CP13-551-00; EA40-013 & EA45-002) 
(Agency Nos. 0000-13-0012.1FHA140001,  
0000-13-0012.1FWW140001, 0000-13-0012.2FHA140001  
& 0000-13-0012.2FWW140001) 
 
Argued on October 29, 2015 
Before:  GREENAWAY, JR., SCIRICA  
       and ROTH, Circuit Judges 
(Opinion filed: August 8, 2016) 
 
3 
 
Aaron J. Stemplewicz, Esquire  (Argued) 
Delaware Riverkeeper Network 
925 Canal Street 
Suite 3701 
Bristol, PA 19007 
   
   Counsel for Petitioners Delaware   
   Riverkeeper Network and  
   Maya Van Rossum 
 
Katherine V. Dresdner, Esquire 
299 Pennington-Titusville Road 
Pennington, NJ 08534 
 
Aaron Kleinbaum, Esquire 
Eastern Environmental Law Center 
744 Broad Street 
Suite 1525 
Newark, NJ 07102 
 
Susan J. Kraham, Esquire 
Edward Lloyd, Esquire   (Argued)  
Columbia University School of Law  
435 West 116th Street 
New York, NY 10027 
 
   Counsel for Petitioners New Jersey 
   Conservation Foundation 
   Stony Brook Millstone Watershed  
   Association and Friends of  
   Princeton Open Space   
 
 
4 
 
Joseph S. Cigan, III, Esquire  (Argued) 
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania 
Department of Environmental Protection 
2 Public Square  
Wilkes-Barre, PA 18701 
 
Kimberly Hummel Childe, Esquire 
Office of Attorney General of Pennsylvania 
Department of Environmental Resources 
P.O. Box 8464 
Harrisburg, PA 17105 
 
Margaret O. Murphy, Esquire 
Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Protection 
400 Market Street 
P.O. Box 8469 
Harrisburg, PA 17105 
 
Curtis C. Sullivan, Esquire 
Department of Environmental Protection 
909 Elmerton Avenue 
Harrisburg, PA 17110 
 
   Counsel for Respondents Secretary 
   Pennsylvania Department of 
    Environmental Protection and  
   Pennsylvania Department of  
   Environmental Protection 
 
 
 
Pamela S. Goodwin, Esquire 
Patrick F. Nugent, Esquire 
5 
 
John F. Stoviak, Esquire  (Argued) 
Saul Ewing 
1500 Market Street 
Centre Square West, 38h Floor 
Philadelphia, PA 19102 
 
Elizabeth U. Witmer, Esquire 
Saul Ewing 
1200 Liberty Ridge Drive 
Suite 200 
Wayne, PA 19087 
 
   Counsel for Intervenor Respondent  
   Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Corp 
 
 
Mark A. Collier, Esquire 
John E. Doyle, Esquire 
Timothy P. Malone, Esquire 
Lewin J. Weyl, Esquire  (Argued) 
Office of the Attorney General of New Jersey 
Department of Law & Public Safety 
Richard J. Hughes Justice Complex 
25 Market Street 
P.O. Box 093 
Trenton, NJ 08625 
 
   Counsel for Respondent New Jersey  
   Department of Environmental Protection 
 
 
Michael K. Rutter, Esquire  
Heather N. Oehlmann, Esquire 
6 
 
Christine A. Roy, Esquire  (Argued) 
Richard G. Scott, Esquire 
Watson, Stevens, Rutter & Roy 
3 Paragon Way 
Suite 300 
Freehold, NJ 07728 
 
   Counsel for Respondent  
   Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Corp   
 
 
_______________ 
 
O P I N I O N 
_______________ 
 
ROTH, Circuit Judge: 
 
 In this appeal, we are called upon to review water 
quality-related permitting actions by New Jersey and 
Pennsylvania for a project by Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line 
Company, LLC (Transco), which operates the 
Transcontinental pipeline, a 10,000-mile pipeline that extends 
from South Texas to New York City.  Transco sought federal 
approval to expand a portion of the pipeline, called the Leidy 
Line, which connects gas wells in Central Pennsylvania with 
the main pipeline.  Pursuant to the Clean Water Act, the 
Pennsylvania and New Jersey Departments of Environmental 
Protection (PADEP and NJDEP, respectively) reviewed 
Transco’s proposal for potential water quality impacts and 
issued permits for construction.  The New Jersey 
Conservation Foundation, Stony Brook-Millstone Watershed 
Association, and Friends of Princeton Open Space 
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(collectively, the Foundation) petitioned this Court for review 
of NJDEP’s decision to issue these permits.  In a separate 
petition to this Court, the Delaware Riverkeeper Network and 
Maya van Rossum (collectively, the Riverkeeper) challenged 
PADEP’s issuance of a Water Quality Certification required 
under Section 401 of the Clean Water Act.  The petitions 
were consolidated for review.  
 
 For the reasons that follow, we conclude this Court has 
jurisdiction to hear these petitions, and NJDEP and PADEP 
did not act arbitrarily or capriciously in issuing the permits.  
Therefore, we will deny the petitions.  
 
I.  Statutory Background  
 Under the Natural Gas Act of 1938,1 the Federal 
Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) has exclusive 
authority to regulate sales and transportation of natural gas in 
interstate commerce.  Section 7 of the Natural Gas Act grants 
FERC the power to authorize the construction and operation 
of interstate transportation facilities.2  Specifically, no 
company or person may construct or extend any facilities for 
the transportation in interstate commerce of natural gas 
without obtaining a “certificate of public convenience and 
necessity” from FERC.3  FERC determines whether a project 
serves “public convenience and necessity” by reviewing a 
number of factors, such as the project’s impact on 
competition for the transportation of natural gas, the 
possibility of overbuilding or subsidization by existing 
                                              
1 15 U.S.C. §§ 717-717z. 
2 Id. § 717f. 
3 Id. 
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customers, avoidance of unnecessary disruptions to the 
environment, the applicant’s responsibility for unsubscribed 
capacity, and the avoidance of unnecessary exercise of 
eminent domain.4  The issuance of a “certificate of public 
convenience and necessity” is conditioned on receipt of state 
and other federal authorizations required for the proposed 
project.5   
 
 Other federal authorizations may be required because 
interstate sales and transmission of natural gas are further 
regulated through federal environmental laws, including the 
National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA)6 and the Clean 
Water Act.7  To comply with NEPA, before issuing a 
certificate of public convenience or necessity, FERC must 
examine the potential environmental impact of a proposed 
pipeline project and issue an Environmental Assessment or, if 
necessary, an Environmental Impact Statement.8    
                                              
4 Transcontinental Gas Pipeline Co., LLC, 149 FERC ¶ 
61,258, 62,676 (2014); see Certification of New Interstate 
Natural Gas Pipeline Facilities, 88 FERC ¶ 61,227 (1999); 90 
FERC ¶ 61,128 and 92 FERC ¶ 61,094 (2000) (clarifying 
policy). 
5 See Islander East Pipeline Co., Algonquin Gas 
Transmission Co., 102 FERC ¶ 61,054 (2003) (“The 
Commission routinely issues certificates for natural gas 
pipeline projects subject to the federal permitting 
requirements of the . . . [Clean Water Act].”). 
6 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370h. 
7 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1388. 
8 42 U.S.C. § 4332; see 15 U.S.C. §§ 717b-1(a), 717n(b)(1); 
40 C.F.R. §§ 1501.1-.8 (implementing NEPA regulations); 18 
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 Although the Natural Gas Act preempts state 
environmental regulation of interstate natural gas facilities, 
the Natural Gas Act allows states to participate in 
environmental regulation of these facilities under three 
federal statutes:  the Clean Air Act, the Coastal Zone 
Management Act, and the Clean Water Act.9  As relevant 
here, the Clean Water Act regulates through a combination of 
state and federal mechanisms:  the U.S. Environmental 
Protection Agency (EPA) limits the discharge of pollutants 
into water bodies,10 and states establish water quality 
standards, subject to EPA approval, that must at a minimum 
comply with EPA’s limits.11   
 
 This combination of state and federal mechanisms is 
apparent when a proposed activity involves discharge of 
dredged or fill material into the navigable waters of the 
United States and thus triggers the permitting requirements of 
Section 404 of the Clean Water Act.12  Section 404 permits 
typically are issued by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers; 
however, a state may assume the authority to administer these 
permits.  Whether or not the state assumes this authority, a 
Section 404 permit may be issued only if the state where the 
discharge will occur issues a Water Quality Certification, 
governed by Section 401 of the Clean Water Act.13  A Water 
                                                                                                     
C.F.R. §§ 380.1-.16 (implementing NEPA regulations for 
FERC actions). 
9 15 U.S.C. § 717b(d). 
10 See 33 U.S.C. § 1311. 
11 See id. § 1313. 
12 Id. § 1344. 
13 Id. § 1341. 
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Quality Certification confirms that a given facility will 
comply with federal discharge limitations and state water 
quality standards.14  Unlike the Section 404 permit, the Water 
Quality Certification is by default a state permit, and the 
issuance and review of a Water Quality Certification is 
typically left to the states.15  
 
 New Jersey has assumed authority to issue Section 404 
permits and delegated administration of the permitting 
program to NJDEP, which exercises this authority pursuant to 
the New Jersey Freshwater Wetlands Protection Act.16  
Therefore, for activities that result in discharge of dredged or 
fill material into New Jersey waters, NJDEP reviews 
applications for Water Quality Certifications and Section 404 
permits.  In contrast, Pennsylvania has not assumed Section 
404 permitting authority.  For activities affecting 
Pennsylvania waters, Section 404 permits are issued by the 
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, and Water Quality 
Certifications are issued by PADEP.  
 
II.  Administrative Background  
                                              
14 Id. § 1341(a)(1), (d). 
15 See, e.g., Lake Erie All. for Prot. of Coastal Corridor v. 
U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 526 F. Supp. 1063, 1074 (W.D. 
Pa. 1981) aff’d, 707 F.2d 1392 (3d Cir. 1983); Roosevelt 
Campobello Int’l Park Comm’n v. U.S. EPA, 684 F.2d 1041, 
1056 (1st Cir. 1982). 
16 N.J. Stat. Ann. § 13:9B-1-30; 33 N.J. Reg. 3045(a); N.J. 
Admin. Code § 7:7A-2.1(c); Memorandum of Agreement 
between the New Jersey Department of Environmental 
Protection and Energy and the United States Environmental 
Protection Agency (1993). 
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 In September 2013, Transco submitted an application 
to FERC for a certificate of public convenience and necessity 
for the Leidy Southeast Expansion Project.  The Project 
consists of two major types of improvements to existing 
natural gas pipelines:  the construction of four new pipeline 
“loops” and the upgrade of turbines at four compressor 
stations.  “Loops” are sections of pipe connected to the main 
pipeline system that reduce the loss of gas pressure and 
increase the flow efficiency of the system.  Compressor 
stations serve a similar function, using gas- and electric-
powered turbines to increase the pressure and rate of flow at 
given points along the pipeline’s route.  In its application, 
Transco proposed installing, within or parallel to existing 
Transco pipelines, approximately thirty miles of loops.  The 
Skillman Loop and the Pleasant Run Loop, totaling 13.23 
miles, would be located in New Jersey; the Franklin Loop and 
Dorrance Loop, totaling 16.74 miles, would be located in 
Pennsylvania.  
 
 FERC completed the requisite Environmental 
Assessment in August 2014, and issued the certificate of 
public convenience and necessity on December 18, 2014.  
The certificate was conditioned on, inter alia, Transco’s 
receipt of “all applicable authorizations under federal law”17 
enumerated in the Environmental Assessment, some of which 
were to be obtained from New Jersey and some from 
Pennsylvania.   
 
 A.  New Jersey  
                                              
17 Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Co., LLC, 149 FERC ¶ 
61,258, 62,687 (2014). 
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 FERC required Transco to obtain the following 
authorizations for each loop from NJDEP:  a Freshwater 
Wetlands Individual Permit, a Flood Hazard Area Individual 
Permit, a Water Quality Certification, and a Letter of 
Interpretation.  Transco first obtained Letters of 
Interpretation, in which NJDEP sets forth the boundaries of 
freshwater wetlands and state-regulated transition areas.18  
Transco then applied for the remaining permits.  In December 
2014, NJDEP deemed those applications “administratively 
complete,” a status that triggered a public notice and 
comment process.  Two months later, NJDEP held a public 
hearing in Princeton, New Jersey.  In light of comments from 
NJDEP staff and the public, Transco submitted revised plans.  
A few days later, NJDEP asked Transco to address additional 
comments, and Transco provided responses.   
 
 In April, NJDEP issued, for each loop, a Freshwater 
Wetlands Individual Permit, a Flood Hazard Area Individual 
Permit, and a Water Quality Certification.  In addition, 
NJDEP released Staff Summary Reports, which set forth the 
findings and analysis underlying its permitting decisions.  
Transco began construction on May 6, 2015.  Two days later, 
the Foundation petitioned this Court for review of NJDEP’s 
decision to issue the permits.   
 
 Later in May, while the Foundation’s petition was 
pending, Transco submitted a request to NJDEP for a minor 
modification to the Freshwater Wetlands Individual Permit 
for the Skillman Loop, to change the excavation method for a 
wetland in Princeton, New Jersey.  NJDEP approved the 
request on June 4, 2015, which the Foundation challenged in 
                                              
18 N.J. Admin. Code § 7:7A-3.1 (2008).   
13 
 
its opening brief.  Later in June, the Foundation filed an 
emergency motion for a stay of construction.  A week later, 
we denied the motion.  At this time, the New Jersey portion 
of the project is substantially complete.19  
 
 B.  Pennsylvania  
   FERC required Transco to obtain from PADEP a 
Water Quality Certification and a Water Obstruction and 
Encroachment Permit.  The latter, issued under Chapter 105 
of PADEP’s regulations, are referred to as “Chapter 105 
Permits.”  FERC further required Transco to obtain a Section 
404 permit from the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers.  Each 
certificate or permit covered both loops in Pennsylvania.  
 
 Transco applied to PADEP for the Water Quality 
Certification in June 2014.  In the following month, PADEP 
published notice in the Pennsylvania Bulletin that it intended 
to issue a Water Quality Certification so long as Transco 
obtained certain other state permits, including a Chapter 105 
Permit.  In April 2015, PADEP issued a Water Quality 
Certification for the project.  Shortly thereafter, the 
Riverkeeper filed a petition in this Court specifically 
challenging the Water Quality Certification.  Three months 
later, PADEP issued a Chapter 105 permit.  After receiving 
all of its required permits, Transco sought permission from 
FERC to proceed with construction.  FERC granted this 
                                              
19 Transco submitted the Declaration of John B. Todd, who 
serves as project manager; Todd indicated that construction 
along both Skillman and Pleasant Run Loops is between 93 to 
100% complete in regulated and non-regulated areas.  
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request in July 2015, during the pendency of the instant 
matter.  
 
III. Threshold Challenges  
 At the outset, we consider challenges by NJDEP and 
PADEP regarding this Court’s jurisdiction, the justiciability 
of the petitions, and whether sovereign immunity shields state 
agency actions.  Specifically, NJDEP and PADEP allege that 
we lack subject matter jurisdiction to review the petitions and 
that, even if we had jurisdiction, the petitions are barred by 
the Eleventh Amendment.  NJDEP further argues that 
because construction in New Jersey is substantially complete, 
the petition is moot. 
 
 A.  Subject Matter Jurisdiction 
 The Riverkeeper and the Foundation, in petitioning 
this Court for review, invoke a provision of the Natural Gas 
Act that confers original jurisdiction on Courts of Appeals 
over certain state and federal permitting actions for interstate 
natural gas pipelines.  Both PADEP and NJDEP contest 
whether that provision applies.  Our jurisdiction ultimately 
depends on whether PADEP and NJDEP acted “pursuant to 
Federal law” in issuing permits to Transco. 
 
 We begin with the statute.  In 2005, Congress amended 
the Natural Gas Act to subject certain state and federal 
permitting decisions for interstate natural gas pipeline 
projects to review by the federal Courts of Appeals.20  
                                              
20 Energy Policy Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-58, Sec. 313, 
119 Stat. 594, 689-90. 
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Specifically, under Section 19(d) of the Natural Gas Act, the 
Courts of Appeals have jurisdiction to review actions 
undertaken (1) by a State administrative agency; (2) pursuant 
to federal law; (3) to issue, condition, or deny a permit, 
license, concurrence, or approval; (4) required for an 
interstate natural gas facility permitted under the Natural Gas 
Act; (5) that is located in the jurisdiction of the circuit Court 
of review.21  The parties do not dispute that all elements are 
met except whether NJDEP and PADEP acted “pursuant to 
Federal law” in issuing Water Quality Certifications, permits, 
and Letters of Interpretation. 
 
 NJDEP and PADEP contend that their decisions to 
issue Water Quality Certifications are not covered by the 
provision that grants jurisdiction to this Court and, 
consequently, we lack jurisdiction to hear these petitions.  
NJDEP further contests our jurisdiction to review those 
authorizations that “exclusively involv[e] issues of State 
law,” including the Flood Hazard Area Individual Permits, 
the Letters of Interpretation, and those portions of the 
Freshwater Wetlands Individual Permits that address state-
regulated issues such as transition areas or state threatened 
and endangered species.  For the following reasons, we hold 
that we have jurisdiction over these petitions. 
 
 B. Jurisdiction over Water Quality   
  Certifications  
 
  1.  Permits Issued by PADEP 
                                              
21 15 U.S.C. § 717r(d)(1) (2005).  This amended section is 
also referred to as “Section 19(d)” based on where it appears 
in the Natural Gas Act. 
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 PADEP argues that this Court does not have 
jurisdiction over Water Quality Certifications because our 
jurisdiction under the Natural Gas Act extends only to state 
agency action taken pursuant to federal law, whereas a Water 
Quality Certification is required by federal law.  This 
argument does not pass muster.  Although the Clean Water 
Act makes clear that states have the right to promulgate water 
quality standards as they see fit, subject to EPA oversight, the 
issuance of a Water Quality Certification is not purely a 
matter of state law.22  A state issues a Water Quality 
Certification for an interstate natural gas facility to certify 
compliance with state water quality standards, promulgated 
under federal supervision, as well as with federally-
established Clean Water Act requirements.23  Specifically, a 
Water Quality Certification confirms compliance with 
Sections 301, 306, and 307 of the Clean Water Act, all of 
which involve federal standards.24  Thus, a Water Quality 
Certification is not merely required by federal law:  it cannot 
exist without federal law, and is an integral element in the 
regulatory scheme established by the Clean Water Act.  To 
say otherwise would be to ignore the EPA’s supervisory role 
in the setting of state water quality standards, the fact that 
Water Quality Certifications must verify compliance with 
federal standards, and the role of the federal government in 
regulating water quality as envisioned by drafters of the Clean 
Water Act.25 
 
                                              
22 See 33 U.S.C. § 1251(b). 
23 Id. § 1341(a)(1). 
24 Id. §§ 1311, 1316, & 1317. 
25 See id. § 1251(a) (presenting the Clean Water Act’s goals 
as a matter of “national policy”).   
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 The conclusion that a Water Quality Certification is 
issued pursuant to federal law is bolstered by the Natural Gas 
Act’s provisions that allow states to regulate or subject state 
action to federal judicial review.   The Natural Gas Act 
preempts state environmental regulation of interstate natural 
gas facilities, except for state action taken under those statutes 
specifically mentioned in the Act:  the Coastal Zone 
Management Act, the Clean Air Act, and the Clean Water 
Act.26  In other words, the only state action over interstate 
natural gas pipeline facilities that could be taken pursuant to 
federal law is state action taken under those statutes.  In 
another provision, Section 19(d), the Natural Gas Act grants 
jurisdiction to the Courts of Appeals to review state agency 
action taken pursuant to federal law except for the Coastal 
Zone Management Act.27  Applying the statutory construction 
canon, the express mention of one thing excludes all others, 
the express exception of the Coastal Zone Management Act 
from review by the Court of Appeals indicates that Congress 
intended state actions taken pursuant to the two non-excepted 
statutes, the Clean Water Act and the Clean Air Act, to be 
subject to review by the Courts of Appeals.  This 
interpretation is supported by the legislative history of the bill 
amending Section 19(d), which indicates that the purpose of 
the provision is to streamline the review of state decisions 
taken under federally-delegated authority.28  Thus, a state 
                                              
26 15 U.S.C. § 717b(d). 
27 Id. § 717r(d)(1). 
28 See Islander East Pipeline Co. v. Conn. Dep’t Envt’l Prot., 
482 F.3d 79, 85 (2d Cir. 2006) (discussing the legislative 
history of the judicial review provision); see also The Energy 
Policy Act of 2005: Hearing Before the H. Subcomm. on 
Energy and Air Quality of the Comm. on Energy and 
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action taken pursuant to the Clean Water Act or Clean Air 
Act is subject to review exclusively in the Courts of Appeals.  
To bar this Court’s review of PADEP’s actions in permitting 
an interstate natural gas facility pursuant to the Natural Gas 
Act and the Clean Water Act would frustrate the purpose of 
Congress’s grant of jurisdiction and render superfluous the 
explicit exception from federal judicial review of the Coastal 
Zone Management Act. 
 
  2.   Permits Issued by NJDEP 
 
 NJDEP argues we have no jurisdiction over the 
Freshwater Wetlands Individual Permits or the Water Quality 
Certifications, and even if we had jurisdiction over those two 
authorizations, we cannot reach issues regarding aspects of 
the Freshwater Wetlands Individual Permits that concern 
transition areas and threatened and endangered species, the 
Letters of Interpretation, or the Flood Hazard Area Individual 
Permits.  We consider each authorization in turn, and 
conclude that each is rooted in NJDEP’s exercise of authority 
that it assumed pursuant to Sections 401 and 404 of the Clean 
Water Act.  
 
                                                                                                     
Commerce, 109th Cong. 420 (2005) (statement of Donald F. 
Santa, Jr., President, Interstate Natural Gas Association of 
America) (observing that “[a]lthough state regulatory action 
[is] preempted” by the Natural Gas Act, “state action pursuant 
to federally delegated authority” is not, and prior to passage 
of the Natural Gas Act’s amendments, review of state 
permitting decisions could “frustrate pipeline projects already 
found by FERC to meet the public convenience and 
necessity.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
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 First, with respect to NJDEP’s argument that we lack 
jurisdiction over the Freshwater Wetlands Individual Permits 
and the Water Quality Certifications, New Jersey’s 
Freshwater Wetlands Protection Act provides for the state’s 
administration of Section 404 permits, and its implementing 
regulations make clear a permit issued under the Act, called 
the Freshwater Wetlands Individual Permit, “constitutes” the 
Water Quality Certification.29  Given that the Natural Gas Act 
provides this Court with jurisdiction to review state 
authorizations issued pursuant to the Clean Water Act, this 
Court has jurisdiction over the Freshwater Wetlands 
Individual Permits and the Water Quality Certifications.   
 
 Next, NJDEP argues that those portions of the 
Freshwater Wetlands Individual Permit that address state 
threatened and endangered species are governed by state law 
rather than the Clean Water Act, and thus are not subject to 
our review.  A Freshwater Wetlands Individual Permit may 
be issued only if the regulated activity “[w]ill not destroy, 
jeopardize[,] or adversely modify a present or documented 
habitat for threatened or endangered species . . . .”30  In 
issuing the permits, NJDEP imposed conditions on the 
proposed activity for the protection of state threatened and 
endangered species.  Given that the Freshwater Wetlands 
Individual Permit constitutes both the Section 404 permit and 
the Water Quality Certification, and that, under Section 401 
of the Clean Water Act, “any other appropriate requirement 
of state law set forth in [the] certification” will be treated as a 
condition on the federal permit affected by the certification—
                                              
29 N.J. Admin. Code § 7:7A-2.1(d).  
30 Id. § 7:7A-7.2(b)(3). 
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in this case, the Section 404 permit31—the conditions that 
protect threatened and endangered species are part of the 
Freshwater Wetlands Individual Permit, and we have 
jurisdiction to review these conditions.  
 
 Under similar reasoning, we have jurisdiction over the 
Flood Hazard Area Individual Permits.  The Freshwater 
Wetlands Protection Act requires compliance with the Flood 
Hazard Act.32  Accordingly, Transco applied for and obtained 
Flood Hazard Area Individual Permits, which enumerate 
conditions on activities in flood hazard areas to protect water 
quality.  The Flood Hazard Area Individual Permit is, in 
effect, a set of conditions on the Freshwater Wetlands 
Individual Permit.  Given that we have jurisdiction over the 
Freshwater Wetlands Individual Permit, we have jurisdiction 
over the Flood Hazard Area Individual Permit as conditions 
set forth in the Water Quality Certification.   
 
 Likewise, the Letters of Interpretation are part and 
parcel of the Freshwater Wetlands Individual Permits, and 
thus subject to this Court’s review.  New Jersey regulations 
require an applicant for a Freshwater Wetlands Individual 
Permit to submit the Letter of Interpretation as part of the 
application package if a Letter has been issued, or “[i]f the 
applicant applies for [a Freshwater Wetlands Individual 
Permit] without first obtaining [a Letter of Interpretation], the 
permit application must include all information that would be 
necessary for the Department to issue [a Letter of 
Interpretation] for the site . . . .  The Department will then 
                                              
31 33 U.S.C. § 1341(d). 
32 N.J. Admin. Code § 7:7A-2.1; see, e.g., id. §§ 7:7A-
4.3(b)(8), (9), 7.2(b)(10).  
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review the submitted wetland delineation as part of the permit 
review process.”33  In other words, a Freshwater Wetlands 
Individual Permit application must include either an issued 
Letter of Interpretation or all the materials required for 
NJDEP to issue such a Letter.  Therefore, the Letters of 
Interpretation are integral to the Freshwater Wetlands 
Individual Permit application and the review process of the 
permit, and thus subject to our review.   
 
 B.  Mootness  
 We next consider NJDEP and Transco’s argument that 
the petition for review is moot because construction is 
complete and Transco has been conducting mitigation and 
restoration.  Thus, any procedural remedy would be 
ineffectual.  The Foundation argues the petition is not moot 
because we can provide relief in the form of additional 
analysis of environmental impact and measures to address 
those effects.  
 
 Mootness raises both constitutional and prudential 
concerns.34  Under Article III, “[i]t is a basic principle . . . that 
a justiciable case or controversy must remain extant at all 
stages of review . . . .”35  Prudentially, a court may decline to 
exercise discretion to grant declaratory and injunctive relief if 
                                              
33 Id. § 7:7A-3.1(h). 
34 Marcavage v. Nat’l Park Serv., 666 F.3d 856, 862 n.1 (3d 
Cir. 2012) (citing Int’l Bhd. of Boilermakers v. Kelly, 815 
F.2d 912, 915 (3d Cir. 1987)).  
35 Decker v. Nw. Envtl. Def. Ctr., 133 S. Ct. 1326, 1335 
(2013) (quoting United States v. Juvenile Male, 564 U.S. 932, 
936 (2011)).  
22 
 
a controversy is “so attenuated” that considerations of 
prudence and comity counsel withholding relief.36  The 
central question in a mootness analysis is “whether changes in 
circumstances that prevailed at the beginning of the litigation 
have forestalled any occasion for meaningful relief.”37  A case 
becomes moot “only when it is impossible for a court to grant 
any effectual relief whatever to the prevailing party.”38  When 
a court can fashion “some form of meaningful relief” or 
“impose at least one of the remedies enumerated by the 
appellant,” even if it only partially redresses the grievances of 
the prevailing party, the case is not moot.39  The Foundation 
challenges NJDEP’s conclusions regarding the proposed 
pipeline’s environmental impact and the amount of mitigation 
required.   
 
 This case is not moot because NJDEP may monitor 
mitigation outcomes following completion of mitigation.  
Specifically, pursuant to New Jersey regulation and as set 
forth in the Freshwater Wetlands Individual Permits and the 
Flood Hazard Area Individual Permits, Transco must submit 
annual reports to NJDEP for three years after completing 
mitigation, and NJDEP may monitor the progress of remedial 
actions.  If mitigation has not met the requirements in the 
                                              
36 Int’l Bhd. of Boilermakers, 815 F.2d at 915-16 n.3. 
37 Jersey Cent. Power & Light Co. v. New Jersey, 772 F.2d 
35, 39 (3d Cir. 1985) (citing Mills v. Green, 159 U.S. 651, 
653 (1985)). 
38 Decker, 133 S. Ct. at 1335 (quoting Knox v. Serv. Emps. 
Int’l, 132 S. Ct. 2277, 2287 (2012)). 
39 In re Cont’l Airlines, 91 F.3d 553, 558 (3d Cir. 1996); 
Isidor Paiewonsky Assocs. v. Sharp Props., Inc., 998 F.2d 
145, 152 (3d Cir. 1993). 
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regulations, NJDEP may direct Transco to perform additional 
mitigation or other remedial action.40  Therefore, there 
remains possible effectual relief because further 
environmental analysis might lead NJDEP to require 
additional mitigation from Transco.  Thus, we conclude that 
this petition is not moot.41   
 
 C.  Sovereign Immunity  
 NJDEP and PADEP contend that any challenge 
brought under Section 19(d) is barred by the Eleventh 
Amendment.  With respect to the Water Quality Certifications 
and Section 404 permits, NJDEP and PADEP argue that their 
mere participation in the Clean Water Act permitting process 
does not waive their sovereign immunity provided by the 
Eleventh Amendment.  NJDEP further argues that when it 
assumed authority to administer Section 404, it explicitly 
                                              
40 N.J. Admin. Code § 7.7A-15:16(c)-(f); see N.J. Admin. 
Code § 7:13-10.2(u)(5); N.J. JA 18-19, 35-37 (“The permittee 
shall monitor forested and/or shrub scrub wetland mitigation 
projects for 5 full growing seasons and emergent wetland or 
State open water mitigation projects for 3 full growing 
seasons beginning the year after the mitigation project has 
been completed . . . The permittee shall monitor the riparian 
project for at least 3 years beginning the year after the 
riparian zone compensation project has been completed.”) 
(Freshwater Wetlands Individual Permits and Flood Hazard 
Area Individual Permits, Pleasant Run Loop and Skillman 
Loop).  
41 See Sierra Club v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 803 F.3d 31, 
43 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (citing Church of Scientology of Cal. v. 
U.S., 506 U.S. 9, 12-13 (1992)). 
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reserved its sovereign immunity for Section 404 actions 
through a Memorandum of Agreement with the EPA.  
Therefore, according to NJDEP, sovereign immunity bars this 
Court from reviewing the Freshwater Wetlands Individual 
Permits, Flood Hazard Area Individual Permits, and Letters 
of Interpretation.  These arguments are unavailing.  As 
discussed below, we hold that New Jersey and Pennsylvania’s 
voluntary participation in the regulatory schemes of the 
Natural Gas Act and the Clean Water Act constitutes a waiver 
of sovereign immunity, given the clear language in those 
statutes subjecting their actions to federal review. 
 
  1.  Overview 
 The Eleventh Amendment of the United States 
Constitution states that federal courts may not hear “any suit 
in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the 
United States by Citizens of another State . . . .” 42  Courts 
have interpreted the amendment as applying to suits against 
states by their own citizens as well,43 and have extended the 
immunity to state agencies.44  The immunity from suit is not 
absolute; Congress has limited power to abrogate the states’ 
immunity.45   
 
 A state may waive its immunity by engaging in 
conduct that demonstrates the state’s consent to suit in federal 
                                              
42 U.S. Const. Amend. XI. 
43 See Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890). 
44 See Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 
89, 100 (1984). 
45 See Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996). 
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court.46   A state may consent to suit in federal court by 
accepting a gift or gratuity from Congress when waiver of 
sovereign immunity is a condition of acceptance.47  When 
Congress makes a gift to a state that Congress is not obligated 
to make and which the state cannot claim as a matter of right, 
Congress may attach conditions to this gift, including a 
waiver of sovereign immunity.48  These “gifts” need not only 
be monetary awards; a congressional grant of regulatory 
authority that a state may not otherwise possess is also a gift.  
We addressed the theory of “gratuity waiver” as applied to a 
grant of regulatory authority in MCI Telecommunications 
Corporation v. Bell Atlantic Pennsylvania, where 
Pennsylvania’s Public Utility Commission argued that a 
section of the Telecommunications Act of 1996,49 which 
provides for federal court review of state-approved 
interconnection agreements, violated the agency’s Eleventh 
Amendment immunity.50  We held that Congress had made 
                                              
46 See Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 241 
(1985); Clark v. Barnard, 108 U.S. 436, 447 (1883). 
47 See College Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. 
Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 686-87 (1999) (holding that while 
states may not constructively waive immunity to Lanham Act 
claims based on term in Trademark Remedy Clarification 
Act, waiver may be a proper condition on authority granted 
by Congress that the state would not otherwise have).   
48 Id.; see Petty v. Tenn.-Mo. Bridge Comm’n, 359 U.S. 275 
(1959); see also South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 206 
(1987) (holding that Congress may attach conditions to the 
receipt of federal funds).  
49 Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (codified in scattered 
sections of 47 U.S.C.). 
50 271 F.3d 491 (3d Cir. 2001). 
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federal judicial review a necessary condition of state 
participation in regulation of telecommunications.  A state’s 
participation in the regulatory scheme constituted acceptance 
of the gift, and, thus, a waiver of Eleventh Amendment 
immunity.51  Nevertheless, mere acquiescence is insufficient 
to abrogate sovereign immunity.  A state’s gratuity waiver 
must be knowing and voluntary.52  In other words, Congress 
must make its intention to condition acceptance of a gratuity 
on the waiver of Eleventh Amendment immunity 
“unmistakably clear.”53  
 
  2.  Sovereign Immunity and Section 19(d) 
 Here, the application of the gratuity waiver doctrine is 
consistent with precedent of our sister courts and supported 
by the language of Section 19(d) of the Natural Gas Act.  In 
Islander East Pipeline Company v. Connecticut Department 
of Environmental Protection,54 the Second Circuit recognized 
that the Natural Gas Act strips states of any authority to 
regulate a particular field—in this case, interstate natural gas 
transmission facilities—save certain “rights of the states” 
granted under those three enumerated statutes, one of which 
is the Clean Water Act.55  Consistent with this doctrine, a 
state participates in Clean Water Act regulation of interstate 
natural gas facilities by congressional permission, rather than 
                                              
51 MCI, 271 F.3d at 510. 
52 College Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. at 675 (citing Beers v. 
Arkansas, 61 U.S. 527, 529 (1857)). 
53 MCI, 271 F.3d at 506. 
54 482 F.3d 79 (2d Cir. 2006). 
55 Islander, 482 F.3d at 90. 
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through inherent state authority.56  A state may refuse the 
grant of authority:  under the Clean Water Act, a state’s non-
participation in water quality regulation returns authority to 
the EPA.  A state also may decline to exercise its authority to 
issue an applicant a Water Quality Certification, and in so 
doing waive the requirement for a Water Quality 
Certification, and the proposed activity proceeds without a 
Water Quality Certification.57  In the context of an interstate 
natural gas facility, a state’s refusal to issue a Water Quality 
Certification would waive the need for the facility to obtain a 
Certification in order to satisfy conditions of FERC’s 
certificate of public convenience and necessity.  In effect, 
such a refusal would return the state’s delegated authority to 
enforce Section 401 of the Clean Water Act to FERC with 
respect to the project.58  Therefore, state participation in the 
regulatory schemes of the Clean Water Act and under the 
framework of the Natural Gas Act constitutes a gratuity 
waiver.   
 
 We agree with the Islander court that the principle of 
gratuity waiver applies to the regulatory scheme established 
by the Natural Gas Act.  Section 19(d) grants the Courts of 
Appeals jurisdiction to review “state agency action.”  This 
language is unambiguous.  New Jersey and Pennsylvania’s 
participation in the regulatory scheme of the Clean Water Act 
with respect to interstate natural gas facilities, pursuant to the 
                                              
56 Id. 
57 33 U.S.C. § 1341(a)(1). 
58 See 15 U.S.C. § 717b(d) (providing that the NGA does not 
affect the rights of states under the Clean Water Act); id. § 
717f(e) (allowing FERC to attach reasonable conditions to a 
certificate of public convenience and necessity). 
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Natural Gas Act and after the amendment of Section 19(d), 
constitutes a waiver of their immunity from suits brought 
under the Natural Gas Act.  In effect, Section 19(d) creates a 
small carve out from sovereign immunity.  Under this limited 
carve out, federal judicial review is proper over those state 
actions regarding interstate natural gas facilities pursuant to 
the Clean Water Act and the Clean Air Act.  
 
 For these reasons, we have jurisdiction over the 
petitions.  We therefore turn to the merits of these petitions. 
 
IV. Merits Challenges  
 A.  Standard of Review  
 The standard of review of state action pursuant to the 
Clean Water Act for an interstate natural gas facility is a 
matter of first impression for this Court.  Consistent with our 
precedent in MCI, which dealt with a similar regulatory 
arrangement, we review de novo state agency interpretation of 
federal law, and review under the arbitrary and capricious 
standard state action taken pursuant to federal law.59  Agency 
action is arbitrary and capricious when the agency fails to 
“examine the relevant data and articulate a satisfactory 
explanation for its action including a rational connection 
between the facts found and the choice made.”60  When we 
review an agency action under this standard, the 
Administrative Procedure Act (APA) directs us to take 
                                              
59 MCI, 271 F.3d at 516; see Islander, 482 F.3d at 93-94.   
60 Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of the U.S., Inc. v. State Farm 
Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
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account of “the rule of prejudicial error.”61  In other words, 
we apply a “harmless error” analysis to any administrative 
action we review;62 mistakes that have no bearing on the 
substantive decision of an agency do not prejudice a party.63  
The party challenging the agency determination bears the 
burden of demonstrating prejudice.64  Where an agency errs in 
fact finding, we remand only if the agency relied on the 
erroneous finding in its decision.65   
 
 B.  New Jersey  
 The Foundation alleges four general problems with 
NJDEP’s issuance of the Freshwater Wetlands Individual 
Permits, the Flood Hazard Area Individual Permits, the Water 
Quality Certifications, and the Letters of Interpretation:  (1) 
NJDEP deprived the Foundation of sufficient opportunity to 
comment, (2) NJDEP issued the Freshwater Wetlands 
Individual Permits based on unsupported conclusions, (3) 
NJDEP erred in determining that Transco met the 
requirements for the Flood Hazard Area Individual Permits 
and hardship exceptions for those permits, and (4) NJDEP 
misconstrued regulation in granting a minor modification for 
the Freshwater Wetlands Individual Permit of the Skillman 
                                              
61 5 U.S.C. § 706. 
62 Shinseki v. Sanders, 556 U.S. 396, 406 (2009) (comparing a 
similarly worded provision applying to appeals of Veterans 
Affairs claims decisions). 
63 See Mass. Trs. of E. Gas & Fuel Assocs. v. United States, 
377 U.S. 235, 248 (1964).  
64 Sanders, 556 U.S. at 409. 
65 See Communist Party of U.S. v. Subversive Activities 
Control Bd., 367 U.S. 1, 67 (1961). 
30 
 
Loop.  We address each in turn and conclude that NJDEP did 
not act arbitrarily or capriciously with respect to the first three 
alleged errors.  We hold that the fourth challenge is not 
properly before this Court.  
 
  1.  Opportunity for Public Comment 
 State regulations require NJDEP, after determining an 
application to be administratively complete, to publish a 
notice of the application in the DEP Bulletin, make the 
application available at its offices in Trenton, and, in some 
circumstances, hold a public hearing.66  The public may 
comment on the application within 30 days of the notice.67  
The Department “shall consider all written public comments 
submitted within this time” and “may, in its discretion, 
consider comments submitted after this date[,]” although state 
regulations do not define “consider.”68  The Foundation 
alleges that NJDEP committed two errors that deprived the 
Foundation of the opportunity to comment on Transco’s 
application.  First, the Foundation argues that NJDEP 
prematurely determined that Transco’s application was 
“administratively complete,” a designation that triggers the 
public notice and comment process, even though Transco had 
failed to include a required element of the application.  
Second, the Foundation argues that NJDEP failed to provide 
proper notice to the public of Transco’s application because 
NJDEP’s initial notice of Transco’s application in the DEP 
bulletin cited only Hunterdon County as the project location 
                                              
66 N.J. Admin. Code §§ 7:7A-12.1, .3, & .4.   
67 Id. § 7:7A-12.3(d). 
68 Id.; see In re Freshwater Wetlands Gen. Permits, 860 A.2d 
450, 461-462 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2004). 
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and omitted three other affected counties—Somerset, 
Princeton, and Mercer.    
 
 Although the Foundation argues that it was deprived of 
an opportunity to comment on the revisions because Transco 
submitted the revised analysis after the close of the public 
comment period, the Foundation reviewed the revised 
analysis and submitted additional written comments from its 
members and two drilling experts and had a face-to-face 
meeting with NJDEP to express its continued concern with 
the proposal.  The record shows that NJDEP asked Transco to 
respond to the concerns raised.  A party challenging the 
sufficiency of the public comment process bears the burden of 
showing it was prejudiced by the lack of opportunity to 
comment.69  The fact that NJDEP ultimately did not adopt the 
Foundation’s view does not mean that the Foundation lacked 
the opportunity to put forth that view.70   
 
 Similarly, petitioners were not harmed by the omission 
of three counties from the initial notice because Princeton 
Ridge Coalition and Stony Brook-Millstone Watershed 
Association—both located in the initially omitted counties—
were aware of the proposal well before the offending initial 
notice was published.  As early as 2013, both had met with 
NJDEP and Transco regarding the proposed project and 
provided written comments.  Therefore, the Foundation has 
                                              
69 Am. Radio Relay League, Inc. v. FCC, 524 F.3d 227, 237 
(D.C. Cir. 2008).  
70 Friends of the Atglen-Susquehanna Trail, Inc. v. Surface 
Transp. Bd., 252 F.3d 246, 265 (3d Cir. 2001) (noting the 
agency was required to consider the comments but was “not 
required to follow the comments”). 
32 
 
failed to demonstrate that it was deprived of the opportunity 
to comment.  For that reason, NJDEP’s actions were not 
arbitrary or capricious.   
 
  2.  Agency Analysis on Environmental  
   Impact of Proposal 
   
 New Jersey regulations require NJDEP to analyze the 
environmental impact of the proposed activity, such as the 
activity’s potential effect on water quality, the aquatic 
ecosystem, and threatened and endangered animals.  The 
Foundation alleges NJDEP acted in an arbitrary and 
capricious manner because NJDEP (1) failed to adequately 
analyze alternatives to the proposed activity that would be 
less environmentally-adverse or result in the minimum 
feasible impairment of the aquatic ecosystem, (2) defined the 
project purpose in such a narrow manner as to exclude 
potential alternatives to the proposed activity, (3) improperly 
concluded that the proposed activity in connection with the 
Skillman Loop will not harm threatened or endangered 
species or their habitats, and (4) improperly determined that 
the proposal is in the public interest.  
 
   a.   Consideration of Alternatives 
 New Jersey regulations require NJDEP to issue a 
Freshwater Wetlands Individual Permit only if certain 
prerequisites are met.  As relevant to this petition, New Jersey 
regulation requires NJDEP to consider practicable 
alternatives to the proposed activity that “would have a less 
adverse impact on the aquatic ecosystem or would not involve 
a freshwater wetland or State open water” and “would not 
have other significant adverse environmental consequences . . 
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. .”71  Where Transco rejected alternatives on the basis of 
constraints such as inadequate zoning, infrastructure, or 
parcel size, NJDEP must consider whether Transco made 
reasonable attempts to remove or accommodate those 
constraints.72  In addition, when a regulated activity would 
take place in wetlands or waters deemed of “exceptional 
resource value” or related to trout production, NJDEP must 
consider whether there is a compelling public need for the 
activity and whether denial of the permit would impose 
extraordinary hardship on the applicant.73   
 
 The Foundation claims that NJDEP insufficiently 
considered alternatives, including those that would have 
resulted in the minimum feasible environmental alteration or 
impairment of the aquatic ecosystem.  The Foundation also 
alleges that NJDEP failed to rebut the presumption that the 
proposed activity has a practicable alternative—such as in 
size, scope, configuration, density, or design—that would 
avoid impact or have a lesser impact, a required analysis 
because the project is a “non-water dependent activity.”74     
 The record shows NJDEP considered potential 
alternatives, such as replacing the existing pipeline with a 
larger one rather than constructing a new loop, increasing 
operating pressure within the existing loop, and building 
various alternative routes.  NJDEP weighed the options, 
adopted some, and rejected others as impractical.  
Specifically, NJDEP required Transco to reduce the size of 
the construction workspace in regulated areas, substitute less 
                                              
71 N.J. Admin. Code § 7:7A-7.2(b). 
72 Id. § 7:7A-7.4(c). 
73 Id. § 7:7A-7.5. 
74 Id. § 7:7A-7.4. 
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environmentally-adverse crossing techniques for six 
wetlands, and use specific drilling methods at three locations 
to reduce impacts.  NJDEP provided explanation for those 
alternatives not adopted.  For example, the use of horizontal 
direct drilling and direct pipe drilling at certain locations 
would be more costly and carried the risk of equipment 
failure, damage to the pipe, and inadvertent release of drilling 
fluid into the soil.  Similarly, alternative routes were 
impracticable because they might interfere with an existing 
water line or cause greater land or wetland disturbance.   
 
 Additionally, NJDEP considered whether the proposed 
activity would affect wetlands or waters categorized as 
“exceptional resource value” or related to trout production.  
NJDEP noted that wetlands in the Pleasant Run Loop were 
neither of exceptional resource value nor trout-producing, and 
that, although certain wetlands in the Skillman Loop were of 
exceptional resource value, compelling public need for the 
project outweighed the impact on wetlands and waters.    
  
 NJDEP not only considered but also acted upon 
alternatives, in direct contrast to the Foundation’s allegations.  
Adoption of alternatives reduced open water and wetland 
disturbance by 38 percent for the Pleasant Run Loop and 48 
percent for the Skillman Loop, according to an NJDEP 
analysis.  For the Skillman Loop, NJDEP consideration of 
alternatives led to the selection of the shortest proposed route, 
of which 86 percent is collocated within Transco’s existing 
pipeline right-of-way.  NJDEP also required those portions 
not collocated to be constructed with a specific drilling 
technique to reduce wetland disturbance.  Therefore, 
NJDEP’s actions were not arbitrary or capricious. 
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   b.  Definition of Project Purpose 
 Next, the Foundation charges NJDEP defined the 
project purpose in such way as to preclude alternatives, by 
including a durational limitation as part of the purpose.  The 
limitation rendered impracticable those construction methods 
that are less environmentally-adverse but more time-
consuming.75  The Foundation’s challenge relies on language 
regarding project purpose in New Jersey regulations on 
practicable alternatives.  Regulations define “practicable 
alternative” as “other choices available and capable of being 
carried out after taking into consideration cost, existing 
technology, and logistics in light of overall project purposes . 
. . .”76  However, neither New Jersey regulations nor case law 
defines the term “project purpose.”  For the present project, 
NJDEP stated that the project purpose was “to construct the 
pipeline and . . . to begin service through the proposed 
pipeline by . . . December 31, 2015.”77  A “short construction 
window” for the project was recommended by the U.S. Army 
Corps of Engineers to reduce disturbance to waterbodies, and 
FERC discussed temporal limitations on construction in its 
order granting the certificate of public convenience and 
necessity.78  Given this concern, NJDEP considered the 
                                              
75 Pet. Br. 46. 
76 N.J. Admin. Code § 7:7A-1.4 (emphasis added).  
77 See N.J. JA 1302 (NJDEP Staff Summary Report, Pleasant 
Run Loop).  
78 E.g., Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Co. LLC, 149 FERC 
¶ 61,258, 62,686 (2014) (“Back Brook . . . will be crossed 
within a 48 hour period . . . which will maintain water flow 
during construction and avoid in-stream construction 
impacts.”). 
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duration of disturbance of water bodies in choosing a drilling 
method, in addition to other factors, such as the number of 
trees that would need to be cleared to provide space for 
worksites.  Therefore, NJDEP’s incorporation of a temporal 
term into the project purpose was not arbitrary and capricious. 
   
    c.  Conclusions Regarding 
Threatened or Endangered Species in the Skillman Loop 
 The Foundation alleges that NJDEP ignored reports by 
the Princeton Ridge Coalition that the project would 
adversely affect the Red-shouldered Hawk and Barred Owl 
and that it failed to impose conditions in the Freshwater 
Wetlands Individual Permit for the Skillman Loop to address 
these impacts.  A Freshwater Wetlands Individual Permit may 
be issued only if NJDEP determines that the regulated activity 
“[w]ill not destroy, jeopardize[,] or adversely modify a 
present or documented habitat for threatened or endangered 
species; and shall not jeopardize the continued existence of a 
local population of a threatened or endangered species . . . .”79  
NJDEP stated in its Staff Summary Reports, “[t]he project 
right-of-way is documented and suitable habitat for . . . 
Barred Owl, Red-shouldered Hawk, Wood Turtle, Indiana 
Bat, and Northern Long-eared Bat.”80  In the Freshwater 
Wetlands Individual Permit for the Skillman Loop, NJDEP 
imposed conditions to protect most of the enumerated species 
but not the Barred Owl or Red-shouldered Hawk.  
Nevertheless, NJDEP stated in its Staff Summary Report that 
“[p]rovided the conditions of the permits are followed . . . no 
                                              
79 N.J. Admin. Code § 7:7A-7.2(b)(3). 
80 N.J. JA 1426 (Freshwater Wetlands Individual Permit, 
Skillman Loop). 
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adverse impacts are anticipated upon threatened/endangered 
species.”  To explain why it did not impose conditions to 
protect the species, NJDEP filed with this Court affidavits 
from a staff member who explained her review of Transco’s 
application and the Foundation’s reports, and her 
consideration of factors such as limited sightings of the 
species, small sizes of the wetlands, and fragmentation of 
habitat because of open areas and neighboring homes.  Based 
on these considerations, NJDEP determined it would not 
impose conditions on the permit regarding the Barred Owl or 
Red-shouldered Hawk.  The Foundation argues that NJDEP’s 
submission constitutes an attempt to supplement the 
administrative record after the fact.  The administrative record 
is supposed to reflect the information available to the decision 
maker at the time the challenged decisions were made, as well 
as the rationale for why the agency acted as it did, but “since 
the bare record may not disclose the factors that were 
considered or the [agency’s] construction of the evidence,” it 
is sometimes appropriate to look to further explanation from 
agency officials to ascertain this rationale.81  Here, the 
affidavits explain staff review conducted prior to issuance of 
the permit.  Therefore, the submissions do not constitute post 
hoc rationalization of agency action.  The Foundation has not 
demonstrated that NJDEP failed to consider potential adverse 
impacts in issuing the Freshwater Wetlands Individual Permit 
for the Skillman Loop.  
 
   d. Public Interest Analysis 
                                              
81 Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 
420 (1971) (abrogated on other grounds by Califano v. 
Sanders, 430 U.S. 99 (1977); see Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n, 
463 U.S. at 50.  
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 To issue a Freshwater Wetlands Individual Permit, 
NJDEP must determine the proposal is “in the public interest” 
on the basis of seven factors.82  The Foundation argues 
NJDEP failed to consider five of the seven factors:  
 
[1] The public interest in preservation of natural 
resources and the interest of the property 
owners in reasonable economic development . . 
.; 
[2] The extent and permanence of the beneficial 
or detrimental effects which the proposed 
regulated activity may have on the public and 
private uses for which the property is suited; 
[3] The quality and resource value classification 
pursuant to N.J.A.C. 7:7A-2.5 of the wetland 
which may be affected and the amount of 
freshwater wetlands to be disturbed; 
[4] The economic value, both public and 
private, of the proposed regulated activity to the 
general area; and 
[5] The functions and values provided by the 
freshwater wetlands and probable individual 
and cumulative impacts of the regulated activity 
on public health and fish and wildlife . . . .83 
 NJDEP did not fail to consider these factors.  
Regarding the first factor, the record shows consideration of 
                                              
82 N.J. Admin. Code § 7:7A-7.2(b)(12). 
83 Id. 
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impact on landowners, surrounding communities, and the 
environment.  For example, NJDEP sought to minimize any 
adverse economic impact by requiring the use of existing 
rights-of-way and areas adjacent and the installation and 
modification of compressors within existing compressor 
station facilities.  As for the second factor, NJDEP considered 
the extent of any detrimental effects and required Transco to 
implement best management practices during construction 
and restoration to limit disturbance to the immediate 
construction and restoration period and avoid permanent 
detrimental effects.   
 
 Likewise, regarding the third factor, NJDEP reviewed 
submissions, inspected sites to verify wetland and water 
boundary lines, and made wetlands resource value 
classifications as set forth in the Letters of Interpretation.  In 
determining whether the proposal is in the public interest, 
NJDEP considered that wetlands in the Pleasant Run Loop 
were not of exceptional resource value, and that certain 
wetlands in the Skillman Loop were of exceptional resource 
value.  Similarly, with respect to the proposed activity’s 
public and private economic value, NJDEP found that the 
project would provide public and private economic value by 
expanding Transco’s pipeline system capacity and serving 
end-users.  Finally, the record shows NJDEP considered the 
functions and values provided by the freshwater wetlands and 
probable impact of the activity on public health and fish and 
wildlife.  NJDEP examined the wetlands’ fishery resources, 
resource value classification, and its role as habitat for 
endangered and threatened species.  The Department also 
considered the scale and duration of disturbance of the 
wetlands, and whether the proposed activity would discharge 
toxic effluent or degrade ground or surface water.   
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 The record rebuts the Foundation’s charge that NJDEP 
reached its public interest determination without considering 
the appropriate factors.  We therefore hold that NJDEP did 
not act arbitrarily or capriciously in issuing the Freshwater 
Wetlands Individual Permits.  
 
  3.  Flood Hazard Area Individual Permits  
 The Foundation claims that NJDEP erred by (1) 
impermissibly issuing the Flood Hazard Area Individual 
Permit for the Skillman Loop because the Flood Hazard Area 
Control Act also prohibits the issuance of permits for 
activities that would adversely affect state threatened or 
endangered species and their habitats; and (2) improperly 
determining that Transco met the requirements of a hardship 
exception for the permits.  
 
 Regarding the first allegation, the Flood Hazard Area 
Control Act, similar to the Freshwater Wetlands Protection 
Act, requires NJDEP to determine that any proposed activity 
will not adversely affect threatened or endangered species or 
their habitats before issuing a Flood Hazard Area Individual 
Permit.84  The Foundation alleges that NJDEP failed to 
consider the expert reports, which concluded that the clearing 
of forest canopy over riparian zones for construction would 
increase fragmentation of mature forest and thus damage the 
habitat of the Red-Shouldered Hawk and the Barred Owl.  
The record shows that NJDEP considered the expert reports 
because, after the Foundation submitted its expert reports, in a 
March 11, 2015, letter, NJDEP directed Transco to address 
                                              
84 N.J. Admin. Code § 7:13-10.6(d). 
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the Department’s concern of “significant adverse impacts” on 
habitat areas of threatened or endangered species and to 
consider alternative construction methods.  In a March 17, 
2015, letter, Transco addressed NJDEP’s concern by 
developing “a unique construction approach” that allowed 
Transco to cut “25 feet off of a typical 75 foot [worksite] 
corridor through environmentally sensitive areas” so that 
fewer trees would be removed and the impact of construction 
on the forest would be “half of what is typically required.”  
That NJDEP directed Transco to revise its application and 
address the Department’s concerns demonstrates NJDEP 
considered potential adverse environmental impact on 
habitats.  Therefore, the grant of a Flood Hazard Area 
Individual Permit for the Skillman Loop was not arbitrary or 
capricious.   
 
 As to the second allegation, the Foundation argues that 
NJDEP incorrectly determined that Transco met the 
requirements of a hardship exception for the Flood Hazard 
Area Individual Permits.  Transco had requested hardship 
exceptions in its applications because the Skillman Loop 
would affect 13.2 acres of riparian zone vegetation, and 
Pleasant Run Loop 7.54 acres, both exceeding regulatory 
limits.85  A hardship exception requires the applicant to 
demonstrate:  
 
(1) Due to an extraordinary situation of the 
applicant or site condition, compliance with this 
chapter would result in exceptional and/or 
undue hardship for the applicant; (2) The 
                                              
85 N.J. Admin. Code § 7:13-10.2, Table C, Maximum 
Allowable Disturbance to Riparian Vegetation. 
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proposed activities will not adversely affect the 
use of contiguous or nearby property; (3) The 
proposed activities will not pose a threat to the 
environment or to public health, safety, or 
welfare; and (4) The hardship was not created 
through the action or inaction of the applicant or 
its agents.86 
In addition, one or more of the following requirements must 
be met:  
 
1. The Department determines that there is no 
feasible and prudent alternative to the proposed 
project, including not pursuing the project, 
which would avoid or substantially reduce the 
anticipated adverse effects of the project, and 
that granting the hardship exception would not 
compromise the reasonable requirements of 
public health, safety and welfare, or the 
environment; 
2. The Department determines that the cost of 
compliance with the requirements of this 
chapter is unreasonably high in relation to the 
environmental benefits that would be achieved 
by compliance; and/or 
3. The Department and applicant agree to one or 
more alternative requirements that, in the 
judgment of the Department, provide equal or 
                                              
86 Id. § 7:13-9.8(b).  
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better protection to public health, safety and 
welfare and the environment.87 
Further, because the proposed construction would cross 
regulated waters, NJDEP must find that the construction of an 
open trench through the riparian zone is necessary to install 
the pipeline.88  
 
 NJDEP’s grant of hardship exceptions was not 
arbitrary or capricious.  Although neither New Jersey 
regulations nor case law defines the term “hardship” as used 
here, state regulations indicate that the nature of the hardship 
may be economic, related to impact from floods, or otherwise 
subject to NJDEP’s determination.89  NJDEP determined that 
Transco addressed all the requirements, namely, that (1) there 
was not a feasible and prudent alternative; (2) the method of 
construction was necessary for safety; (3) granting the 
exception would not compromise reasonable requirements of 
public health, safety and welfare, or the environment; and (4) 
requiring compliance would impose a hardship on Transco, 
which Transco did not create through action or inaction.  
Given these determinations, we hold that the Department did 
not act arbitrarily or capriciously in granting the hardship 
exceptions to the Flood Hazard Area Individual Permits.   
     
 4.  Grant of Minor Modification to the 
Freshwater Wetlands Individual Permit for the Skillman 
Loop  
                                              
87 Id. § 7:13-9.8(a), 10.2(s).  
88 Id. § 7:13-10.2(k)(1)(i). 
89 See id. § 7:13-9.8.  
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 The Foundation challenges NJDEP’s grant of a minor 
modification for Transco’s Freshwater Wetlands Individual 
Permit for the Skillman Loop as contrary to New Jersey 
regulation.  After hard rock and boulders under wetlands in 
the Princeton Ridge damaged drilling equipment, Transco 
sought a minor modification to the permit to use a different 
drilling method than the method NJDEP had originally 
permitted.  By regulation, a modification of the Freshwater 
Wetlands Individual Permit is “minor” if it involves 
 
[a] change in materials, construction techniques, 
or the minor relocation of an activity on a site, if 
the change is required by another permitting 
agency. However, this change is not a minor 
modification if the change would result in 
additional wetland, State open water or 
transition area impacts over those of the original 
permit or waiver.90  
In granting the minor modification, NJDEP concluded FERC 
was the requisite “permitting agency” that required the 
change, because in approving the particular route of the 
Skillman Loop, FERC implicitly required the change in 
drilling technique to maintain the route.  NJDEP also 
concluded the change in drilling method would not result in 
additional disturbance.   
 
 This challenge is not properly before us.  At the time 
of the filing of the petition, the challenged agency action must 
                                              
90 Id. § 7:7A-14.3(c)(4) (emphasis added). 
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be ripe for review.91  The Foundation petitioned for review on 
May 8, 2015, but the minor modification was not applied for 
until May 29, 2015, and granted on June 4, 2015.   
 
 Based on the foregoing, we hold NJDEP did not 
deprive the Foundation of sufficient opportunity to comment 
and did not act arbitrarily or capriciously in issuing permits 
and other authorizations.  We further hold the challenge of the 
minor modification for the Freshwater Wetlands Individual 
Permit of the Skillman Loop is not properly before this Court. 
 
 C.  Pennsylvania 
 The Riverkeeper raises two challenges to PADEP’s 
issuance of a Water Quality Certification:  (1) PADEP failed 
to review an environmental assessment prepared by Transco 
before issuing the Water Quality Certification, as required by 
state regulations; and (2) the materials that PADEP did 
review were substantively insufficient.  The Riverkeeper has 
not demonstrated prejudice from these alleged errors. 
 
                                              
91 See TeleSTAR, Inc. v. FCC, 888 F.2d 132, 133 (D.C. Cir. 
1989) (agency action that was not final at the time of filing of 
petition may only be reviewed upon the filing of another 
petition); W. Union Tel. Co. v. FCC, 773 F.2d 375, 378 (D.C. 
Cir. 1985) (court lacked jurisdiction over a challenge to a 
now-final agency action that was filed before action became 
final); Pennzoil Co. v. FERC, 645 F.2d 394, 398 (5th Cir. 
1981) (requirement that an agency’s action be ripe for judicial 
review before merits of any review petition will be addressed 
is one which applies to action of other agencies as well as that 
of FERC).  
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  1. Sequence of Agency Action 
 The Riverkeeper’s first challenge involves whether 
PADEP was required to engage in an environmental review 
prior to issuing a Water Quality Certification, or whether 
PADEP may, as it did here, postpone environmental review 
until after a Water Quality Certification has been issued.   
Although PADEP has not published any procedures for 
issuing Water Quality Certifications, applicants for the 
Chapter 105 permits who are required to obtain Water Quality 
Certifications must “prepare and submit” an environmental 
assessment for PADEP’s review.92  The Riverkeeper infers 
from this requirement that PADEP must review an 
environmental assessment prepared as part of an application 
for a Water Quality Certification before issuing a 
Certification.  Based on this inference, and because PADEP 
did not do so, the Riverkeeper alleges that PADEP erred by 
failing to review an environmental assessment prior to issuing 
a Water Quality Certification to Transco.  PADEP argues that 
for complex projects that require a large number of state and 
federal permits to ensure compliance with state water quality 
standards—such as interstate natural gas pipelines—this 
sequence is not mandatory and would cause unnecessary 
delay if strictly followed.93   
 
                                              
92 25 Pa. Code § 105.15(b) (2011).  
93 See Clean Water Act Section 401 State Water Quality 
Certification: A Water Quality Protection Tool for States and 
Tribes, EPA Office of Wetlands, Oceans and Watersheds, 25 
(April 2010) (stating that states are not required to implement 
Water Quality Certification procedures). 
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 The Riverkeeper has failed to demonstrate that it 
suffered harm from the sequence of PADEP’s permitting 
actions.  According to FERC’s certificate, Transco could not 
begin construction until it obtained all applicable 
authorizations required under federal law.  One of these 
federal authorizations, the Water Quality Certification, was 
conditioned on the issuance of, inter alia, a Chapter 105 
Permit.  Prior to issuing a Chapter 105 Permit, PADEP was 
required to review an environmental assessment prepared by 
Transco.  Thus, construction could not begin until after 
PADEP had reviewed an environmental assessment, 
regardless of whether this review occurred before the Water 
Quality Certification was issued.  Because environmental 
review was required before construction could begin, the 
Riverkeeper was not harmed by the timing of the required 
review, and PADEP did not act arbitrarily or capriciously.   
 
 The Riverkeeper alleges that as a result of PADEP’s 
failure to review the environmental assessment prior to 
issuing the Water Quality Certification, FERC prematurely 
authorized tree felling activities.  According to the 
Riverkeeper, in delaying review of the environmental 
assessment, PADEP postponed substantive determinations 
until after the issuance of the Water Quality Certification, 
which allowed trees to be felled in contravention of 
Pennsylvania water quality standards.  The record does not 
support the Riverkeeper’s view of the timeline of events.  In 
fact, FERC authorized tree felling several weeks before 
PADEP issued the Water Quality Certification.  Therefore, 
the Water Quality Certification could not have led to tree 
felling because such felling was approved without a 
Certification.   
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 Moreover, the Riverkeeper is incorrect in assuming 
that tree-felling is implicated by PADEP’s substantive water 
quality determinations:  the Army Corps of Engineers stated 
that the tree-felling activity for which Transco sought 
authorization would not trigger the need for permits under the 
Clean Water Act.  FERC designated the tree-felling activity 
as “pre-construction activity,” while FERC’s certificate 
requires a Water Quality Certification only for “construction 
activity.”  This suggests that FERC allows tree-felling activity 
to be authorized without Transco obtaining any Clean Water 
Act permits.  Thus, there is no nexus between the tree felling 
activity and the Water Quality Certification, and the 
Riverkeeper’s challenge fails.  
 
  2. Sufficiency of Factfinding 
 The Riverkeeper alleges that PADEP relied on an 
incomplete environmental assessment from Transco and 
failed to correct the assessment’s deficiencies prior to issuing 
the Water Quality Certification.  PADEP and Transco counter 
that the majority of the Riverkeeper’s arguments relate not to 
the issuance of the Water Quality Certification, but the 
issuance of the Chapter 105 Permit.  We find this argument 
unavailing.  Because the Chapter 105 Permit was a condition 
of the Water Quality Certification, it is inextricably 
intertwined with the Water Quality Certification.94  
Nevertheless, because the Riverkeeper does not challenge the 
Chapter 105 Permit specifically and argues only that the 
Water Quality Certification itself was improperly issued, we 
                                              
94 See Tenn. Gas Pipeline Co. LLC. v. Delaware Riverkeeper 
Network, 921 F. Supp. 2d 381, 387-88 (M.D. PA. 2013). 
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will address the Riverkeeper’s challenges only as they pertain 
to the issuance of the Water Quality Certification.  
 
 The Riverkeeper alleges two problems with PADEP’s 
environmental review:  (1) PADEP relied on incorrect 
wetlands classifications without gathering data necessary to 
correct these classifications; and (2) construction activity was 
improperly authorized because the faulty wetlands 
classifications led PADEP to ignore construction impacts on 
exceptional value wetlands.  We will consider these 
arguments in turn.  
   
  a. Wetlands Classifications 
 Under Pennsylvania regulations, classifying a wetland 
as “exceptional value”95 triggers a number of regulatory 
protections, including a more stringent permitting process that 
disallows construction where construction will have an 
“adverse impact” on these wetlands.96  The Riverkeeper 
contends that Transco improperly classified wetlands in the 
application it submitted to PADEP for a Water Quality 
Certification, because Transco (1) used incorrect 
                                              
95 “Exceptional value” wetlands are those that serve as habitat 
for a threatened or endangered species, or are hydrologically 
connected to, or lie within one half mile of, such a wetland; 
are located in or along the floodplain of a wild trout stream or 
a national wild or scenic river, or such a tributary; are located 
along an existing drinking water supply; or are located in an 
area designated as a “natural” or “wild” area within a state 
forest or park or a designated federal wilderness or natural 
landmark.  25 Pa. Code § 105.17(1). 
96 See id. § 105.18a(a). 
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classification terms, and (2) miscategorized wetlands that are 
of “exceptional value” as belonging to a lesser protected 
category.  As evidence, the Riverkeeper cites to a table in an 
environmental assessment prepared by Transco that identified 
affected Pennsylvania wetlands and their state classifications.  
This table identifies wetlands as “ordinary,” “intermediate,” 
“exceptional,” and “other.”  As the Riverkeeper correctly 
points out, these terms are not used by PADEP, which 
classifies wetlands either as “exceptional value” or “other.”97  
The Riverkeeper argues that Transco’s incorrect 
classifications frustrated PADEP’s ability to determine the 
correct classification for the affected wetlands and adhere to 
state water quality standards.  In addition, the Riverkeeper 
alleges that at least eleven wetlands affected are “exceptional 
value” wetlands but were marked as “ordinary” or 
“intermediate” in Transco’s table.  According to the 
Riverkeeper, PADEP’s failure to address these problems is 
evidence that it has acted arbitrarily and capriciously.98 
 
 To prevail in its petition, the Riverkeeper must show 
not only that an error was made but that the error in question 
prejudiced the Riverkeeper in some way.99  In this instance, 
the Riverkeeper can only claim to have suffered prejudice 
from Transco’s classifications if PADEP actually relied on 
those classifications; otherwise, the error, if any, was 
harmless.  The prejudice the Riverkeeper alleges is simple:  
PADEP would not have issued the Water Quality 
                                              
97 Id. § 105.17. 
98 See Pa. Trout v. Dep’t Envt’l Prot., 863 A.2d 93, 98 (Pa. 
2004) (discussing requirements for wetlands classifications). 
99 See supra Section IV.A. 
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Certification if Transco had properly classified wetlands in its 
environmental assessment.  
 
 The Riverkeeper’s argument falls short.  PADEP is not 
required to review a project’s effect on wetlands prior to 
issuing a Water Quality Certification.  In this case, a review 
was required before PADEP could issue the Chapter 105 
Permit, and Transco had to obtain the Chapter 105 Permit as a 
condition of the Water Quality Certification.100  Thus, while 
Transco may have submitted miscategorized information for 
the Water Quality Certification, that submission was of no 
consequence since a full review of the appropriate wetland 
categories was conducted before the Chapter 105 Permit was 
issued.  PADEP had ample time and opportunity to request 
that Transco remedy any shortcoming in analysis during these 
review processes, and the Riverkeeper also had the 
opportunity to submit its comments on the Chapter 105 
Permit as well as other state permits not at issue.  No 
additional review was required before PADEP could issue the 
Water Quality Certification.  There is nothing in the record to 
indicate that PADEP relied on Transco’s miscategorized 
submission in issuing the Certification.  Therefore, we hold 
that any error in Transco’s initial classification of wetlands 
did not prejudice the Riverkeeper.   
 Because the Riverkeeper has not demonstrated that 
PADEP relied on these classifications, we need not address 
the Riverkeeper’s argument that PADEP failed to collect and 
                                              
100 See 25 Pa. Code § 105.14(b)(13) (requiring determination 
of impact on wetlands for Chapter 105 permits); cf. id. § 
92a.21(d)(3) (allowing PADEP to require an applicant for an 
NPDES permit to provide information on a project’s wetlands 
impact). 
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analyze the necessary data to make appropriate wetlands 
classifications following their receipt of Transco’s 
environmental assessment.   
 
  b. Authorization of Construction Activity 
 The Riverkeeper also alleges that PADEP erred in 
authorizing construction activity that violates state water 
quality standards.  This challenge is broader than the 
Riverkeeper’s challenge regarding FERC’s authorization of 
tree-felling:  rather than arguing that a sequencing error 
resulted in some particular activity, the Riverkeeper here 
alleges that any construction that would follow the issuance 
of a Water Quality Certification violates Pennsylvania water 
quality standards.  The Riverkeeper contends that this is true 
because any construction impact on an exceptional value 
wetland is “adverse.”  According to the Riverkeeper, because 
construction could not begin without the issuance of the 
Water Quality Certification, and construction would 
adversely affect what the Riverkeeper alleges are exceptional 
value wetlands, PADEP’s decision to issue a Water Quality 
Certification authorized construction activity that violated 
Pennsylvania water quality standards.  However, PADEP 
itself has no power to “authorize” construction of interstate 
natural gas facilities because the only government entity that 
may do so is FERC.101  While FERC would not allow 
construction to occur without a Water Quality Certification, 
the Certification is only relevant because it is required by 
FERC’s certificate of public convenience and necessity.  The 
Natural Gas Act grants FERC exclusive authority to authorize 
                                              
101 See Schneidewind v. ANR Pipeline Co., 485 U.S. 293, 302-
04 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 717f(c)). 
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construction by issuing a certificate of public convenience 
and necessity, as FERC did here.102  Any interested party may 
file a petition with FERC for a hearing on the issuance of a 
certificate, and we note that the Riverkeeper did participate in 
such a hearing.103  In contrast, PADEP’s role in the permitting 
process is to certify that any construction that occurs is in 
accordance with Pennsylvania water quality standards.  
PADEP did so here by requiring Transco to obtain various 
state permits and submit to the review processes associated 
with these permits.   
 
 Because the Riverkeeper has not shown that it was 
prejudiced by PADEP’s permitting actions, we see no reason 
to disturb PADEP’s decision to issue the Water Quality 
Certification. 
 
VI.  Conclusion  
 For the foregoing reasons, we conclude NJDEP and 
PADEP did not act arbitrarily or capriciously in issuing 
permits and related authorizations to Transco.  We decline to 
address the challenge of NJDEP’s grant of a minor 
modification to the Freshwater Wetlands Individual Permit of 
the Skillman Loop.  Accordingly, we will deny the petitions.   
                                              
102 15 U.S.C. § 717f(c). 
103 See 15 U.S.C. § 717n(e); 18 C.F.R. § 156.10. 
